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Abstract 
Banking industry worldwide has been transformed due to globalization, financial liberalization, 
technological developments, government policies, deregulation of financial services, financial crises and 
increase in mergers and acquisitions since 1980. With these changes, there is a trend towards decrease in 
the number of banks and increase in banking concentration. Increase in banking concentration might affect 
competition conditions in banking industry. The decrease in the number of banks and the increase in 
banking concentration dominate the Turkish banking industry after the banking crises in 2000 and 2001. 
This paper examines the relationship between concentration and competition in Turkish banking industry. I 
measure the size of banking concentration by concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman index with 
the data of commercial deposit banks in Turkey from 2000 to 2012. Competition degree is measured by 
using Panzar Rosse model. The results of the study suggest that there is no permanent relation between 
banking concentration and competition in Turkish banks. 
Key Words: Banking industry, banking concentration, competition, Panzar Rosse model. 
JEL classification: G21, D40 
Introduction 
Banking industry has been transforming by financial liberalization and globalization worldwide after 1980s. 
Deregulations and technological developments accelerated the transformation. Government policies and ease of 
regulations encouraged consolidation. Mergers and acquisitions among banks increased due to the desire to obtain 
market power and to maximize the shareholder value. Furthermore, financial crises hit the banks as financial 
liberalization and globalization expanded. Bank failures and further consolidation occurred after financial crises.  All 
these changes in banking sector raised a trend towards decrease in the number of banks and increase in banking 
concentration. 
Increase in banking concentration is closely related to the scale and the number of the banks in the sector. Tendency 
towards reduced number of banks and change in the scale of banks cause more concentrated banking industry. 
Concentrated banking industry affects the competition and the efficiency of banks, the market prices and the financial 
stability.  
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The reports of international financial institutions remark that increasing concentration might change market structure 
and reduce competition. When banking concentration becomes higher, it can possibly lead to non-competitive levels 
of interest rates. More concentrated markets could cause less competitive environment. Banks with increased market 
power could follow risky policies that increase systemic risks. As banks become ‘too big to fail’ scale, they might use 
their influence to shape banking regulations and policies (Bank for International Settlements, 2001, International 
Monetary Fund, 2001, Group of Ten, 2001). On the other hand, there are some opposite studies that suggest 
increasing concentration might have positive impacts on banking industry. It is claimed that concentrated banking 
systems tend to have larger, better-diversified and strong banks which lead to positive link between concentration and 
stability. Banking concentration is associated with a lower probability that the country suffers a systemic banking 
crisis. It is also stated that banking concentration is not a proxy for a less competitive banking environment (Beck et 
al, 2003 and 2005).  There is also similar trend toward increasing banking concentration in Turkish banking industry. 
Macroeconomic instability and structural problems in 1990s in Turkish banking industry resulted in 2000 and 2001 
banking crises. Banking sector involved more small size banks before the crises. The bank crises caused bank failures 
and the number of banks in the market reduced. Reconstruction period after crises also affected the bank structure and 
concentration in the banking sector. In this paper, I will focus on increased concentration and its relation between 
competition in Turkish banking industry after 2000 and 2001 banking crises. 
There are two major streams which are structural and nonstructural approaches in order to assess the degree of 
competition and the relation between concentration and competition. Main hypothesis of the structural approach are 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis and efficiency hypothesis. SCP hypothesis which is developed by 
Mason (1939) and Bain (1951) suggests that market structure affects market performance through the conduct or the 
behavior of banks. Market structure is defined by the concentration ratio in SCP hypothesis. When the concentration 
ratio is high, the market is close to monopoly. On the contrary, the market is close to perfect competition with lower 
concentration. According to SCP hypothesis, banks behave less competitive as banking concentration rises and there 
is a reverse relationship between banking concentration and competition. According to the efficiency hypothesis 
which is developed by Demsetz (1973), firm behavior is driven by efficiency rather than market power and structure. 
Firms seek to produce at a more efficient scale in order to achieve lower costs and higher profits. Efficient firms will 
increase their productivity and market share as well as concentration in the market. There is a positive relationship 
between concentration and competition in the efficiency hypothesis. Both structural hypotheses provide one way 
causality from market structure to performance. Because of the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of the structural 
models, non-structural models of competitive behavior have been developed. Non-structural models are New 
Empirical Industrial Organization approaches, namely the Iwata model, the Bresnahan model, the Panzar and Rosse 
model and Boone competition indicator model. These New Empirical Industrial Organization approaches measure 
competition in the market by empirical analysis. In this paper, I will use the Panzar and Rosse model in order to assess 
the degree of competition in Turkish banking system. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a review of related literature about relation between banking 
concentration and competition. Section 3 presents banking concentration in Turkish banking industry. Section 4 
introduces and explains the Panzar Rosse model. Then, an empirical model for Turkish banking is introduced,  data 
and empirical results are reported. Section 5 discusses relation between competition and concentration in Turkish 
banking industry. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
Literature Review 
There are many empirical studies assessing relationship between concentration and competition in banking sector. 
While some studies find reverse relation between banking concentration and competition, the others find that there is 
not any relevance between concentration and competition. 
Bikker and Groeneveld (1998) study competition and concentration in 15 European Union countries over the time 
span of 1989 and 1996. They use Panzar Rosse methodology to assess the degree of competitiveness in the banking 
industry of the European countries as a whole and for individual countries. Assets of the five biggest banks as a 
percentage of total assets (CR-5) are used as a measure of concentration. They find that European banking sectors 
operate under conditions of monopolistic competition as varying degrees for each country. Their results also support 
that concentration impairs competitiveness as SCP hypothesis suggests. 
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Jansen and Haan (2003) analyze the relationship between concentration, competitiveness, efficiency and profitability 
in the European Union banking markets. They use the data of banks in 15 European countries between 1985 and 1999. 
CR-5 and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are used as the concentration indicators whereas Panzar Rosse model is 
used to measure competition degree. Their results do not suggest the existence of any association between 
concentration and competition at the macro level. 
Casu and Girardone (2006) also investigate the impact of increased concentration on the competitive conditions of 
European Union banking sector. Using bank level balance sheet data for the major European banking markets (16 
European countries) in a period following the introduction of the Single Banking License (1997-2003), CR-3, CR-5 
and HHI concentration indicators show increased concentration in most European Union countries. Nonstructural 
Panzar Rosse model is used to investigate the impact of increased concentration on the competitive conditions of EU 
banking markets. Estimations of Panzar Rosse model for competition indicate monopolistic competition in the 
countries between 1997 and 2003. They find a little evidence that concentration is negatively associated with 
competition and most efficient banking systems are also the least competitive. 
Bikker and Haaf (2000a) seek to measure the degree of competition in banking markets of 23 industrialized countries 
between 1988 and 1998, and to investigate the impact of concentration on competition.  They apply Panzar Rosse 
model and Bresnahan model to 5.444 banks from 23 industrialized countries in order to assess competition level. CR-
3, CR-5, CR-10 and HHI are used to assess concentration level. They conclude that small banks seem, on average, to 
operate under less competitive conditions than large banks and there is reverse relation between concentration and 
competition.  
Gelos and Roldos (2002), Yeyati and Micco (2003) and Yıldırım and Philippatos (2006) investigate concentration and 
competition in Latin American banking market. In 1990’s, Latin American banking market faces significant process 
of bank consolidation and increased concentration due to banking crises. Using banking data of 8 countries between 
1994 and 2000, Gelos and Roldos find that markets have not become less competitive as concentration increases. 
They assess that lowering barriers to entry as allowing increased participation of foreign banks appears to have 
prevented a decline in competitive pressures associated with consolidation. Also, Yeyati and Micco study the 
experience of Latin American banking sectors for accelerated process of concentration and foreign participation 
during 1990s. They use bank level database of 8 Latin American countries between 1996 and 2002 in order to assess 
concentration ratios and competition degree. Using CR-3, CR-5, HHI and Panzar Rosse method, they find that 
concentration did not reduce competition in the industry, but foreign penetration appears to have led to less 
competitive banking sectors. Yıldırım and Philippatos examine the consolidation and competitive conditions in the 
banking industries of eleven Latin American countries for the period from 1993 to 2000. They also find supportive 
results that banking concentration is not significantly related with competitive conduct. 
Aysan, Güneş and Abbasoğlu (2007) investigate the concentration, competition, efficiency and profitability of the 
Turkish banking sector in the post crises period. Using the data from the banks that operated between 2001 and 2005, 
they measure the degree of concentration by CR-3, CR-5 and HHI and the degree of competition in the market by 
applying Panzar and Rosse method. Their empirical results do not suggest the existence of any relationship between 
concentration and competition. 
Concentration in Turkish Banking Industry  
Banking sector has a high share in Turkish financial system.  The share of the banking sector in Turkish financial 
system is 76.2% as reported in the financial markets report of the Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency in 2011. There are three types of banks in Turkey; commercial banks, development and investment banks and 
participation banks (Islamic banks). According to the Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency reports in 
2012, commercial banks constitute 91% of the banking system, development and investment banks constitute 4% of 
the banking system and participation banks constitute 5% of the banking system.  
Table 1 shows the changes in the numbers of banks from 1960 to 2012. There is an increasing trend in bank numbers 
from 1980 to 2000. Financial liberalization after 1980s in Turkey is the main reason for this trend.  The number of 
banks decreased dramatically after the banking crises in 2000 and 2001. 
 
Serpil Kuzucu/ International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies 
Vol 4, No 3, 2015 ISSN: 2147-4486 





Table 1. The number of banks in Turkey (1960-2012) 
  1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 
Commercial Banks 51 46 44 40 40 47 56 55 61 34 32 32 
      Public Banks 14 12 12 12 12 12 8 5 4 3 3 3 
      Private Banks 20 23 22 23 24 20 25 32 28 17 11 11 
      Foreign Banks 5 5 5 5 4 15 23 18 18 13 17 17 
      Local Banks 12 6 5 - - - - - - - - - 
     Banks under control of  









Investment and Development 
Banks 
2 2 2 3 3 10 13 18 13 13 13 
Participation Banks - - - - - - n/a n/a n/a 4 4 4 
Total 51 48 46 42 43 50 66 68 79 51 49 49 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey 
In order to evaluate the concentration level in Turkish banking industry, I calculate banking concentration ratios by 
using data obtained from Banks Association of Turkey database. Annual total asset figures of commercial banks 
operating between 2000 and 2012 are used to calculate concentration ratios (CR-3, CR-5 and CR-10) and Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI). CR-3, CR-5 and CR-10 indicates market share of 3, 5 and 10 largest banks in the market 
respectively. HHI is the sum of the squares of bank sizes measured as market shares. 
The concentration indicator results are reported in Table 2. There is a significant rise in concentration ratios after 
2000. While CR-3, CR5, CR-10 and HHI are, respectively, 0.33, 0.48, 0.69 and 0.06 in 2000, they increase to, 
respectively 0.46, 0.63, 0.85 and 0.10 in 2005. Concentration ratios remain stable after 2005.  
Table 2.  The concentration ratios of the banks in Turkey between 2000 and 2012 
Year  The Number of Banks CR-3 CR-5 CR-10 HHI 
2000 79 0.33 0.48 0.69 0.06 
2001 61 0.37 0.56 0.80 0.08 
2002 54 0.40 0.58 0.81 0.09 
2003 50 0.43 0.60 0.82 0.09 
2004 48 0.43 0.60 0.84 0.09 
2005 47 0.46 0.63 0.85 0.10 
2006 46 0.42 0.63 0.86 0.10 
2007 46 0.41 0.62 0.85 0.10 
2008 45 0.41 0.62 0.86 0.09 
2009 45 0.43 0.63 0.87 0.10 
2010 45 0.42 0.63 0.87 0.10 
2011 45 0.40 0.61 0.87 0.10 
2012 45 0.38 0.60 0.87 0.09 
Source:  The ratios were calculated by the author, using the data from The Banks Association of Turkey. 
Competition in Turkish Banking Industry 
Panzar Rosse Model  
The method was developed by Panzar and Rosse in 1977 and 1987. The model is used to assess market structure and 
degree of competition in the banking sector. It estimates reduced form revenue equation based on cross section data. 
The H statistics which shows competition degree in the market is calculated from the reduced form revenue equation. 
H statistics is the sum of the elasticities of the reduced form revenues with respect to factor prices. Value of the H 
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statistics ranges between −∞ < H ≤ 1 . If H is smaller than zero, market is monopoly. If it ranges between zero and 
unity, market is monopolistic competition. H of unity indicates perfect competition (Bikker and Haaf, 2000b). 
In empirical studies, the ratio of interest revenues to total assets, the ratio of total revenues to total assets, total 
revenues or interest revenues are used for dependent variables. Panzar Rosse model includes input prices and bank 
specific factors as explanatory variables. Many studies use the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets or the 
number of the employees as a proxy for labor price, the ratio of interest expenses to total funds as a proxy for the 
funds price and the ratio of other expenses to fixed assets as a proxy for capital price. Bank specific factors such as 
equity to total assets, the ratio of loans to total assets, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the ratio of other 
income to total interest revenue, total assets and total loans are chosen to reflect differences in risks, costs and size of 
banks. Bikker et al (2006) remark that using scale variables (e.g. size of deposits, loans, equity or total revenues) as 
dependent or explanatory variables will lead misspecifications. It is stated that using size variables in the model 
overestimates the degree of competition (H) and introduces a bias towards perfect competition. Panzar Rosse model is 
the most popular method as a measurement of competition in empirical studies. Shaffer (1982) and Nathan and Neave 
(1989) are the pioneer researchers using Panzar Rosse methodology. Shaffer evaluates the market structure of banks 
in New York. Nathan and Neave estimate the competition level among banks in Canada. They both choose total 
revenues as dependent variable.  
After studies of Shaffer, Nathan and Neave, Panzar Rosse model is used for assessment of competitive structure of 
banking industry in latter empirical researchs. Bikker ve Groeneveld (1998), Casu ve Girardone (2006), Sun (2011) 
and Weill (2004) study competitive structure in the Eurpean banking industry, Bikker ve Haaf (2000) assess market 
structure of banking industry in 23 industrialized countries, Gelos and Roldos (2002), Yeyati and Micco (2003), 
Yıldırım and Philippatos (2006) research competitiveness of banks in Latin American countries, Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) study degree of competition in banking sector for fifty countries. All researchers use Panzar Rosse 
methodology by choosing suitable dependent and independent variables in their studies. In Turkey, Çelik and Kaplan 
(2010), Özcan (2012), Aysan, Güneş and Abbasoğlu (2007) study market structure and competitiveness in Turkish 
banks.  
Table 3. Selected studies in which Panzar Rosse Model is used 
Authors Countries considered Period Result 
Shaffer New York / United States 1979 monopolistic competition 
Nathan and Neave Canada 1982-1984 
1982: perfect competition 
1983-1984:monopolistic 
competition 
Gelos and Roldos  8 countries 1994-2000 monopolistic competition 
Yeyati and Micco  8 Latin American countries 1996-2002 monopolistic competition 
Yıldırım and Philippatos  11 Latin American countries 1993-2000 monopolistic competition 
Bikker and Groeneveld  15 European countries 1989-1999 monopolistic competition 
Bikker and Haaf  23 industrialized countries 1988-1998 monopolistic competition 
Claessens and Laeven 50 countries 1994-2000 monopolistic competition 
Sun 11 European countries, United States 1995-2009 monopolistic competition 
Casu and Girardone  15 European countries 1997-2003 monopolistic competition 
Weill 13 European countries 1994-1999 monopolistic competition 
Çelik and Kaplan Turkey 2002-2007 
2002-2004, 2007: monopoly 
2005-2006:monopolistic 
competition 
Özcan Turkey 2002-2009 monopolistic competition 
Aysan, Güneş and 
Abbasoğlu 
Turkey 2001-2005 monopolistic competition 
Serpil Kuzucu/ International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies 
Vol 4, No 3, 2015 ISSN: 2147-4486 






The empirical Panzar Rosse Model 
I use the Panzar Rosse model in order to assess market structure and competition level in Turkish Banking sector 
between 2000 and 2012. In the empirical analysis, below reduced form equation for revenues is used; 
	lnINTR = α଴ +	αଵlnAFR	 +	αଶlnPCE +	αଷlnPPE + αସlnOI + αହlnDD	 +	α଺lnLO + α଻lnEQ + e      
where INTR is the ratio of total interest revenue to total assets, AFR is the ratio of annual interest expenses to total 
funds, PCE is the ratio of all other expenses to fixed assets, PPE is the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of 
personnel, OI is the ratio of other income to total interest revenue, DD is the ratio of demand deposits to total assets, 
LO is the ratio of loans to total assets, EQ is the ratio of equity to total assets and e is the error term. AFR, PPE and 
PCE are proxies for the unit prices of the funds, labor and capital respectively. Bank specific exogenous factors are 
OI, DD, LO and EQ. I do not use scale variables as explanatory variable in consideration of misspecification. 
Data and empirical results  
I apply Panzar Rosse model to the commercial banks which operated between 2000 and 2012. Annual unconsolidated 
balance sheet and income statement data were obtained from the Banks Association of Turkey. Table 4 provides the 
number of the banks in the sample set. According to 2012 figures, 27 commercial banks in the sample set constitute 
90.3% of the total banking industry in Turkey.  
Table 4. The number of observations 
Year 
Number  of 
banks   Year Number  of banks   Year Number  of banks 
2000 46 2005 27 2010 29 
2001 34 2006 30 2011 26 
2002 37 2007 28 2012 27 
2003 30 2008 29 
2004 33   2009 29       
The model is estimated annually by using the sample data. Table 5 reports the empirical results of the OLS 
estimations of Panzar Rosse Model. H statistics which shows competition levels is the total of AFR (the ratio of 
annual interest expenses to total funds), PCE (the ratio of all other expenses to fixed assets) and PPE (the ratio of 
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Table 5. Empirical results of Panzar Rosse Model 
 
Variables 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
                            
AFR 0.49*** 0.62*** 0.39*** 0.37** 0.05 0.59*** 0.57*** 0.41*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 0.25*** 0.52*** 0.74*** 
(0.49) (6.10) (6.11) (4.33) (0.61) (3.06) (6.68) (3.17) (6.27) (3.86) (3.41) (7.35) (6.79) 
PCE 0.03 0.11* 0.07* 0.12* 0.05 0.11* 0.05** 0.10** (0.17)*** 0.16** 0.22*** 0.13*** 0.01 
(0.78) (1.71) (1.70) (1.91) (0.80) (1.81) (2.27) (1.99) (4.06) (2.49) (4.23) (3.86) (0.23) 
PPE 0.15* 0.17 0.04 -0.22** 0.27*** (-2.32) (-0.87) (-1.04) -0.17 0.05 0.17** -0.01 0.25*** 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.04) (-2.16) (2.89) (-2.32) (-0.87) (-1.04) (-1.58) (0.33) (2.83) (-0.01) (1.87) 
OI -0.11*** -0.11** -0.08* -0.12*** -0.10* 0.1 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.1 -0.22*** 0.07 0.03 
(-2.74) (-1.73) (-2.04) (-3.06) (-2.01) (1.35) (-0.34) (-0.69) (0.60) (1.05) (-3.70) (1.38) (0.48) 
DD 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 0.26*** 0.1 0.05 0.01 -0.12 -0.36** -0.15** -0.36*** -0.39** 
(0.16) (-0.59) (-0.51) (-0.95) (3.51) (1.03) (1.12) (0.26) (-1.37) (-2.40) (-2.64) -7.27 -2.48 
LO 0.01 0.05 -0.13** -0.03 -0.12** -0.11 0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.25*** 0.07 0.25** 
(0.07) (0.83) (-2.67) (-0.59) (-2.44) (-1.45) (0.91) (0.87) (-0.59) (0.27) (4.45) (0.96) (2.32) 
EQ 0.13* -0.05 0.1 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.09 0.22** 0.12 0.1 0.33*** 0.04 0.30** 
(1.96) (-0.62) (1.56) (4.64) (3.22) (3.20) (1.39) (1.99) (1.57) (0.91) (3.37) (0.60) (2.15) 
Cons. 1.27** 1.82 2.37*** 2.28*** 2.07*** 0.8 1.08* 1.27 0.85 2.24** 1.28*** 2.16*** 1.44 
  (2.44) (1.34) (5.11) (3.45) (3.15) (0.97) (2.27) (1.64) (1.43) (2.82) (3.40) (6.55) (1.16) 
F-statistics 7.4*** 10.9*** 18.2*** 12.6*** 5.9*** 8.8*** 22.3*** 4.8*** 14.4*** 4.90*** 3.47*** 24.4*** 10.4*** 
R2 0.57 0.74 0.81 0.8 0.62 0.76 0.88 0.65 0.82 0.64 0.92 0.9 0.79 
Adj. R2 0.49 0.67 0.77 0.73 0.52 0.67 0.84 0.51 0.77 0.51 0.89 0.86 0.71 
No. of obs. 46 34 37 30 33 27 29 26 29 27 28 26 27 
H-statistics 0.671 0.901 0.501 0.271 0.371 0.461 0.571 0.401 0.681 0.911 0.641 0.641 1.002 
Notes. t-values in parenthesis. ***p<0.01. **p<0.05. *p<0.10  
1Wald Test for H=0 and H=1 rejected. 2Wald Test for H=1 not rejected 
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Table 6. H-statistics and results 
Year H-Statistics Result 
2000 0.67 Monopolistic competition 
2001 0.90 Monopolistic competition 
2002 0.50 Monopolistic competition 
2003 0.27 Monopolistic competition 
2004 0.37 Monopolistic competition 
2005 0.46 Monopolistic competition 
2006 0.57 Monopolistic competition 
2007 0.40 Monopolistic competition 
2008 0.68 Monopolistic competition 
2009 0.91 Monopolistic competition 
2010 0.64 Monopolistic competition 
2011 0.64 Monopolistic competition 
2012 1.00 Perfect Competition 
 
H-statistics ranges from 0.27 to 1.00 between 2000 and 2012. There is a significant decrease in competition level from 
2001 to 2003. H is 0.90 in 2001 and decreases to 0.27 in 2003. The decrease in the competition level follows 2000 and 
2001 banking crises in Turkey. The competition levels in these years seem to be affected from the crises. During this 
period, the dramatic decrease in the number of banks, the reduction in the customer reliance to the banks and 
macroeconomic reasons must have affected the competition in the industry. The competition level tends to increase 
after 2003. The period after 2003 is the period in which recovery in the general economic conditions and resurgence 
in the financial structure of the banks took place. Moreover, entry of some foreign banks into the market influenced 
the competition in this period.  Perfect competition is maintained in 2012.   
The Relation between Competition and Concentration in Turkish 
Banking Industry 
There is an increasing trend in concentration after year 2000. When concentration ratios (CR3, CR5 and CR10) and 
HHI are considered, there is a significant rise in concentration in Turkish banking sector from 2000 to 2005. After 
2005, concentration level remains stable. According to SCP hypothesis, concentration level is the determinant for the 
market structure. Market structure has effect on market performance via affecting behavior of banks. As increase in 
concentration level, banks will behave less competitively and it will lead competition level to decrease.  
When concentration ratios and competition levels in Turkish banking industry are compared, banking concentration 
increases significantly after 2000 and it is stable after 2005. On the other hand, competition level decreases 
dramatically from 2000 to 2003 and it starts to increase after 2004. It reaches to perfect competition level in 2012. 
If only period between 2001 and 2003 is evaluated, there is a reverse relationship between banking concentration and 
competition as indicated in SCP hypothesis. As concentration rises, competition level decreases in this period. If 
assumptions of SCP hypothesis were valid, competition levels must remained at low levels even after 2003. But 
competition level increases rapidly after 2003. Therefore, reverse relation between concentration and competition is 
transient and concentration is not the main variable impacting competition. 
There are many other factors that affect competition level in the banking sector. Besides banking concentration, bank 
numbers, entry restrictions in the banking sector, foreign bank ownership, activity restrictions on banking, financial 
stability, macroeconomic conditions, banking profitability and efficiency are some other factors that impact 
competition level in the banking sector.  
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Bank numbers decreased considerable after 2000 and 2001 banking crises. New entries to banking sector were not 
allowed until 2011. Bank failures during crises decreased the reliance of the customers. Because full government 
security on deposit accounts were removed in order to ensure financial stability in the sector during restructure period, 
banking customers tended towards public banks and big private banks. In addition, economic activity in Turkey 
reduced significantly due to crises. Economic problems of the crises, sudden decrease in the number of banks, the loss 
of customer reliance are all negative factors for competition. Survival in the market became more important than 
competition for the banks due to crises. 
Banking restructure and economic programs that applied after 2000 and 2001 crises ensured financial and economic 
stability, strengthening of banking sector and decrease in inflation and interest rates. Decrease in inflation and interest 
rates resulted net interest margin narrowing. As interest revenues reduced, banks raised competition in order to 
increase other revenues. Progress in banking sector and macroeconomic environment has positive impact on 
competition after 2003.  
Domestic borrowing requirement of public sector were reduced significantly by economic program and commercial 
banks directed their activities to financial intermediation. Share of loans in total assets started to increase significantly 
after 2004 and it has positive impacts on competition. Entry of foreign banks to Turkish market has also positive 
influence on competition. 
Banks started to increase branch numbers and personnel numbers after 2004 in order to compete in the market. 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency has a role in increasing efficiency and competition in banking industry. 
In restructuring period, public and private banks’ capital structures were restored. Capital adequacy ratios were 
improved. Banks with strong capital structure gained power to compete in the market. In addition, Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency ensures public informing and transparency in the banking sector and it leads 
positive effect on competition. 
Conclusion 
There is a dramatic decrease in the bank numbers after the bank crises in 2000 and 2001 in Turkey. This paper seeks 
to assess concentration and competitive conditions in Turkish banking industry for the period 2000-2012. 
Concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index are calculated by using annual total asset figures of commercial 
banks operating between 2000 and 2012.  The results show that there is a significant rise in banking concentration 
from 2000 to 2005. After 2005, it remains stable until 2012. I apply Panzar Rosse model in order to assess 
concentration degrees in banking industry. Using data of commercial banks operating between 2000 and 2012, the 
model estimations report that Turkish banking industry experiences monopolistic competition in the period from 2000 
to 2011 and maintains perfect competition in 2012. H statistics show a significant reduction in competition degree 
from 2000 to 2003, however it tends to rise after 2003. There is a transient reverse relationship between competition 
and concentration from 2000 to 2003, however it disappears after 2004.  
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